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NOTES
of this interpretation is that the claim need not be filed for at least fifty
years subsequent to acquisition. .For this reason, the provision perhaps
would be of little effect.
None of these interpretations is satisfactory. The language of the
provision clearly, is inadequate to indicate a choice. And at least one
construction would raise constitutional questions. The only solution is
immediate clarification by the legislature in order to aid judicial con-
struction.
The re-recording acts provide a desirable solution to the chronic
problem of land alienability. As a supplement to the recording system, the
statutes require that interests in land to be protected against extinguish-
ment by a purchaser for value, must be a matter of record within a certain
period prior to the purchase. Such legislation is, naturally, a valid exercise
of the police power; the states' authority to regulate the holding of
property by requiring timely recording has long been recognized.52 The
fairness and efficacy of the acts are remarkable: simple re-recording
gives almost maximum protection to security of title, but immaterial
and irrelevant data will no longer constitute a deterrent to land
alienability.5 3
ESCHEAT OF CORPORATE STOCKS AND DIVIDENDS
In their constant quest for revenue, many states have enacted legis-
lation incorporating common law principles of escheat.' In all juris-
dictions, real and personal property is appropriated in event of its
52. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1910), where Mr. Chief Justice
White said: "As it is indisputable that the general welfare of society is involved
in the security of titles to real estate and in the public registry of such titles, it is
obvious that the power to legislate as to such subjects is in the very nature of gov-
ernment."
53. So far there have been very few re-recordings under the statutes. Record
Land Titles, supra, note 20. Whatever the reasons, attorneys who fail to inform
their clients of the acts are shirking their professional responsibility. While some
interests -may have already been -defeated, timely re-recording will still generally be
effective. Until the acts become well known, the courts may wish to construe them
liberally, so that present non-re-recorded interests may be given a grace period. One
method of accomplishing this result would be to require that a purchaser have relied
upon the act in his abstract examination. Reliance by title examiners and re-recorda-
tion by land claimants are equally dependent upon knowledge of the new systqm of
title recordation.
1. In medieval land law, escheat was a tenurial right of the feudal, lord, which,
after the Statute of Quia Emptores, became a right of the king. 7 HoLDsworH, AN
HIsToRIcAL INTRODUCTION To LAND LAW 33 (2d ed. 1936). When an owner abandoned
personal property, or died intestate without heirs, the property was appropriated by
the Crown under the doctrine of Bona Vacantia; the rationale being that the claim
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abandonment or the death of the owner intestate, without heirs.' Usually,
there is "outright" escheat, in which case title vests absolutely in the
state.3 However, states with "custody" statutes4 merely take possession
until the owner appears, deriving the financial benefits during the
interval. 5 Even this latter type legislation frequently includes a provision
for vesting of title in the state after a period of limitation.6
While the states' right to escheat real and most types of personal
property is well established, the appropriation of intangibles has been the
subject of frequent controversy. The states' authority has been upheld
as to: dormant bank accounts, 7 unclaimed deposits with utility com-
panies,8 monies paid into court for distribution, 9 and unclaimed insur-
ance proceeds. 10 Recent litigation in the United States Supreme Court
has added to this list unclaimed shares of stock and accrued dividends.
In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,1 the state was permitted to
escheat twelve shares of stock and accrued dividends under a general
escheat statute. The defendant, a New Jersey chartered corporation, con-
tended that the state court judgment violated due process of law in that
notice by publication to the unknown owners was insufficient; that al-
though the company maintained an office within the state, the situs of
the property was elsewhere ;12 and that the company would face multiple
of the Crown in behalf of society was more equitable than that of a stranger. See
Hardman, The Law of Escheat, 4 L.Q. REv. 318 (1888). In the United States, escheat
has been applied to both real and personal property on the basis 61 sovereignty rather
than tenure. In re Melrose Ave., 234 N.Y. 48, 53, 136 N.E. 235, 237 (1922).
2. Escheat is a prerogative of the states. Cunnius v. Reading School District,
198 U.S. 458 (1905). The federal government has no common law escheat power.
United States v. Klein, 15 F. Supp. 473, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1934).
3. Mass. Acts, c. 455, § 1949A; MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1053(1) to 26.1054(6)
(Cum. Supp. 1949) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2:53-1 to 2:53-32 (Cum. Supp. 1950) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. tit. 18, C. 9, §§ 1-8 (1943).
4. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 313.010 to 393.990 (1948); N.Y. ABANDONED PROPERTY LAW
§§ 101-1500.
5. See Garrison, Escheat, Abandoned Property Acts, And Their Revenue Aspects,
35 Ky. L.J. 302, 315 (1947). New York collected $21.5 million in the first fifteen
months under its abandoned property law.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 (Cum. Supp. 1950). For a summary of the early
escheat statutes, see Garrison, supra note 5, at 308.
7. Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Security Savings Bank
v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell, 265 Pa. 71,
108 Atl. 441 (1919).
8. In re Philadelphia Electric Co., 352 Pa. 457, 43 A.2d 116 (1945) ; Commonwealth
v. York Water Co., 53 York Leg. Reg. 113 (Pa. 1939).
9. In re Escheat of Moneys in Custody of United States Treasury, 326 Pa. 260,
192 Atl. 256 (1937); United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276 (1938); United States v.
Klein, 106 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 618 (1939); Klein v.
Broderick, 15 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
10. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
11. 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
12. The corporate dividends were paid out of accounts maintained in New York
banks.
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NOTES
liability to the owners and other states escheating the same property. 13
In disposing of these contentions the Court held the situs of the
stock to be immaterial.'" Personal jurisdiction over the corporation
operated as a seizure of the res.' 5 This supported notice by publication,
which was adequate under the circumstances, so as to permit determina-
tion of the rights of the unknown owners. 16 Thus, the New Jersey
court's judgment, valid and entitled to full faith and credit,17 effectively
precluded future actions against the corporation by subsequently appear-
ing owners or other states seeking to appropriate the identical property.
On the basis of the Standard Oil decision, any state with an
13. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 431 (1951). The Standard
Oil Company also attacked the validity of the New Jersey statute on the grounds
of impairment of contract. However, the Court found no violation because no agree-
ment for the disposition of the stocks and dividends, in the event they were unclaimed,
had been made. Thus, the question of whether a corporation could protect itself from
escheat by taking advantage of the contract clause, contractually providing for the
disposal of unclaimed shares and dividends, was not passed upon. A provision could
be included in the share certificates vesting title in the corporation when dividends have
been unclaimed for a specified period. 11 FLETCHER Cyc. CORP. § 5163 (Perm. ed.
1932). However, in view of the social interest in the states' acquisition of abandoned
property, and the general ineffectiveness of the contract clause of the Federal Con-
stitution today, it is doubtful if any attempt to vest title in the corporation, would
prevail over a state escheat statute. See Hale, The Supreme Court And The Contract
Clause, 57 HARv. L. REv. 512, 621, 852 (1944).
14. "Since choses-in-action have no spatial or tangible existence, control over
them can 'only arise from control or power over the persons whose relationships are
the source of the rights and obligations.' Situs of an intangible is fictional but control
over the parties whose judicially coerced action can make effective rights created by
the chose-in-action enables the court with such control to dispose of the rights of
the parties to the intangibles." Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 439(1951).
15. At common law, the transfer of a share of stock was not complete until
the old certificate was delivered to the corporation, canceled, the new owner entered
on the corporate books, and the new certificate issued. 2 CooK, CORPORATioNs § 374 (8th
ed. 1923). The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, adopted by New Jersey, N.J. REV. STAT.
§§ 14:8-27 (1937), operates to make the transfer of the certificate the sole operative act;
thereby unifying the certificate and the share of stock. See 'Commissioner's Note, 6
U.L.A. 2 (1922). The Supreme Court considered the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
to be inapplicable to the problem of unclaimed stock. See 341 U.S. 428 (1951), at 441.
16. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 432 (1951).
17. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 442 (1951). However the full
faith and credit clause might not prevent liability if the corporation merely relin-
quished the property to an escheating state without the formality of a judgment. The
states have never been required to give effect to the statutes of another state to the
same extent that they must recognize foreign judgments. See Pacific Employers
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) ; Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); STUMBERG, CONFLICT
oF LAWS 62 (_d ed. 1951); but see Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). Also,
there is a considerable question as to the credit that must be given determinations
of an administrative agency of another state. Compare Industrial Commission of
Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947), with Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U.S. 430 (1943); See SUMtBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 221 (2d ed. 1951); Note.
23 IND. L.J. 214 (1948).
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escheatable interest and personal jurisdiction over the corporation may,
in its own forum, render a judgment of escheat that must be accorded
full faith and credit. If this be taken as the exclusive basis for valid
jurisdiction, the forum for escheat would be limited to the state of
incorporation, and states where the corporation is doing businessI S or
where personal jurisdiction may otherwise be obtained by consent. How-
ever, the opinion would not seem to preclude other possible forums which,
under various theories respecting the situs of an ,intangible, have exer-
cised valid jurisdiction in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem. Thus, where
the state of incorporation and the state of the forum have enacted the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, valid jurisdiction has been predicated
on the provision that the res is at the situs of the certificate.19 Likewise,
the state of the last known owner may well assert jurisdiction on the
theory that the situs is with the creditor.20 The necessity of obtaining full
faith and credit jurisdiction in order to satisfy due process requirements
becomes even more important in view of the difficulties facing a state
seeking escheat in another state's forum.2'
In addition to the securing of valid jurisdiction is the requirement
of sufficient interest or contact with the transaction to justify escheat.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in the Standard Oil decision, 22 enumer-
ated possible states with an escheatable interest as: the domicile of the
last known owner, the residence of the later appearing owner, the
corporation's main place of business, or the place of incorporation. Thus,
in the escheat of bank deposits, the state of the bank's location has
been permitted to take possession on the grounds that the intangible was
18. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corporation Commission,
339 U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
McBain, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 331 (1946).
19. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1934). "(1) Shares in a corporation
are subject to the jurisdiction of the state in which the corporation was incorporated.
(2) The share certificate is subject to the jurisdiction of the state within whose terri-
tory it is. (3) To the extent which the state in which the corporation was incorpo-
rated embodies the share in the certificate, the share is exclusively subject to the
jurisdiction of the state which has jurisdiction over the certificate." See BEALE, CONb-
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 53.1, 262.1 (1935) ; Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939).
Contra: Harvey v. Harvey, 290 Fed. 653 (7th Cir. -1923) ; McQuillen v. National Cash
Register Co., 13 F.Supp. 53 (D.C. 1936).
20. Miller v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 432, 110 P.2d 419 (1941); In re Lyon's Estate,
175 Wash. 115, 26 P.2d 615 (1933). See Pomerance, The Situs of Stock, 17 CORNELL
L.Q. 43 (1931).
21. It has been generally held that a tax lawfully imposed in a foreign state
cannot be collected by a suit in another state. Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
Contra: State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193
S.W.2d 919 (1946).
22. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 445 (1951).
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within the state and subject to its control.23  The authority of a state to
escheat monies in the custody of a federal court within the state was
extensively litigated and upheld in the Klein cases. 24 In Connecticut Life
Insurance Co. v. Moore25 an insurance policy was issued by a foreign
corporation and delivered in New York on the life of a New Yorl
resident. The beneficiary was a New York resident on the maturity date
of the policy. 26 In a declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court
upheld New York's claim of adequate contacts with the persons and
events to support an escheat of the unclaimed proceeds. 2 7 The obligation
to pay in respect to a life insurance policy would seem sufficiently analo-
gous to unclaimed stocks and dividends to permit their escheat by any
one of several states under the Moore case. Thus, a state may escheat
obligations due and owing to its citizens from foreign corporations or
persons as well as obligations which its chartered corporations owe to
citizens of foreign states.
The effect of a rule which permits any one of several contacts to
support escheat is, as Mr. justice Frankfurter warned in his dissent in
the Standard Oil decision,2 8 to induce a "race of diligence" among the
competing states. Regardless of the merit of a state's claim, it may lose
potential revenue by requiring a longer period of abandonment than a
sister state. The obvious alternative for a state faced with this loss is
to reduce its period of limitation to a minimum. 2 9 The result of wide-
23. Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 231 (1944) ;- Provident Inst.
for Saving v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911). Contra: Ii4 re Lyon's Estate, 175 Wash.
115, 26 P.2d 615 (1933).
24. See note 9 supra. The money escheated was the unclaimed balance of certain
monies which the United State District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania ordered paid
to bondholders by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in Brown v. Pennsylvania
Canal Co., 229 Fed. 444 (E.D. Pa. 1916), aff'd, 235 Fed. 699 (2d Cir. 1916).
25. 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Notes, 1 STAN. L. REv. 342 (1949); 58 YALE L.J. 628
(1949).
26. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). The Court
refused to pass upon the question of the insured moving from the state after delivery
of the policy, or where the beneficiary is not a resident of the state at maturity of
the policy.
27. The New York statute provided that "any moneys held or owing" by life
insurance companies in the following three classes- of policies issued on the lives of
residents of New York shall be deemed abandoned property: (1) matured endowment
policies which have been unclaimed seven years; (2) policies payable on death where
the insured, if living, would have attained the limiting age under the mortality table
on whith the reserves are based and as to" which no transaction has occurred for seven
years; and, (3) policies payable on death in which the insured has died and no claim
by the person entitled thereto has been made for seven years. N.Y. ABANDONED PROP-
ERTY LAw § 700.
28. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341
U.S. 428, 443 (1951).
29. It is probable that due process of law prohibits an unrestricted lowering of
the period of abandonment. However, the permissible, period. could vary between cus-
1117
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spread resort to this practice is undesirable, as it greatly increases the
possibility that the owner will subsequently appear and discover his
property irretrievably lost to the state.
Possible solutions to resolve the competing claims of eligible states
are suggested by reference to other areas where jurisdictional conflicts
have arisen. Analogous is the problem of state taxation of intangibles.
The present approach of the Supreme Court is to permit the imposition
of such taxes by any state which provides sufficient benefits to the owner
of intangibles to justify its, exacting a tribute.3 0 Thus, an intangible is
subject to multiple taxation without a violation of the due process clause.
However, this approach was rejected in the Standard Oil decision, on
the basis of the full faith and credit clause. Escheat, involving complete
appropriation of the property instead of a portion, as in tax, necessarily
requires this result; otherwise the corporation would be penalized for
the fortuitous disappearance of its shareholders. A number of states,
in an attempt to alleviate the resulting hardships of multiple taxation,
have enacted reciprocal statutes providing for collection only by the
decedent's domiciliary state.3 ' A uniform statutory scheme modified
to cope with the escheat conflict offers a possible alternative.
A second area in which the Court has pursued a policy of non-
interference in the clashes of interests of two or more states is that in-
volving multiple levies of death taxes based upon conflicting claims as to
the domicile of the deceased.32 However, when the assets of the decedent's
estate are insufficient to meet the taxes of all the levying states, a
controversy between the states arises within the meaning of Art. III,
§ 2 of the Constitution.3 3 Therefore, a claimant state may institute an
original suit in the nature of a bill of interpleader in the Supreme Court,
bringing before the court other taxing states and the estate. The Court
will then determine which state has the superior claim to the domicile
of the decedent, and thus the right to tax the estate.
This suggests a possible remedy for the states with a claim to
abandoned stocks a'nd dividends faced with the loss of such property
to another state. Since the owner and other states are deprived of all
todial and outright escheat statutes. Since custodial statutes only change the posses-
sion of the property from the corporation to the state, leaving the owner's rights intact,
a shorter period may be permitted than for escheat statutes where the owner's right
is extinguished.
30. Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357 (1939); Schuykill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938).
31. Comment, 34 IowA L REv. 129 (1948).
32. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937); Dorrance v.
Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 660 (1932). See Tweed and Sargent, Death and Taxes Are
Certain_-But What of Domicile, 53 HARv. L. Rxv. 68 (1939).
33. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
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claims against the corporation by a valid escheat judguxient, a conflict
over who is entitled to the property exists between the claimant states.
An original action in the Supreme Court to determine the superior right
to the property would therefore seem appropriate. Moreover, the
Standard Oil case did not foreclose the possibility that property already
taken by a state under a valid escheat judgment could be the subject
of a suit against that state by another state seeking to assert a superior
claim. And where the property is escheated under a custodial statute,
other states might be permitted to divest the escheating state of the
stocks and dividends. 34 The opening of any or all of these possible courses
of action will make necessary the adoption of some criteria by the
Supreme Court for deciding which state has the superior claim.
Among the factors favoring the claim of the state of residence
of the last known owner are: the more rateable distribution of the finan-
cial benefits among the several states; the greater probability that the
stockholder earned and purchased the shares in this state under the
protection of its laws; the greater likelihood that the owner will receive
actual knowledge of the escheat action through notice by publication in
this state than in some other state where he may never have resided;
and the state could be ascertained from the corporate books. However,
the corporate books would not necessarily reveal the name and residence
of the last owner of the stock as shares may be transferred without a
change on the books under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. 35 Other
disadvantages are the possible inability of that state to obtain jurisdiction
of the corporation and the burden upon the company in resisting escheat
action in many diverse jurisdictions.
The basis of the claims of the state of the later proved true residence
of the stockholder is substantially the same as that of the state of last
known residence, bulwarked by the added factor that it is the proved,
rather than probable, last residence of the owner. However, the identity
of this state would be known only after the property had been escheated
by another state, and could not be discovered in all cases at any given
time. Thorough and expensive searches would be necessary to determine
with any certainty the last state of residence of a substantial proportion
of the missing owners. 36 Custodial statutes would probably be necessary
34. A possible solution suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 445 (1951).
35. See Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 6 U.LA. 2 (1922).
36. By 1947, less than four percent of the owners baa reappeared and claimed
property taken into custody under the New York statute. See Note, 58 YALE: L.J. 628,
633 (1949). A thorough search for the missing owners would be the ideal solution,
but the expense measured against the value of the abandoned property makes this an
impractical remedy. Thus, the stock escheated in the Standard Oil case was valued
at only $300.
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for this state to assert its claim, and uncertainty as tQ the finality of
escheat actions would be created.
Both the state of incorporation and the state in which the corpora-
tion has its main place of business confer substantial benefits upon a
company so as to justify a requirement that the abandoned stocks
and dividends of the company be escheatable by either of them.3 Fur-
thermore, the courts of either state would have little difficulty in obtain-
ing jurisdiction over the corporation, and it would be more convenient to
the corporation to litigate escheat actions -in only the one state. However,
there would be a greater improbability that notice by publication would
actually apprise the owner of the pending escheat proceeding. More
important, those states with liberal incorporation laws or enjoying a
high degree of industrialization would be disproportionately enriched.
It is probable that each of these states has a sufficient basis, con-
sidered alone, for escheating stocks and dividends. Further, any one
state's claim may be fortified by the composition of two or more of the
categories into one. For instance, the state of incorporation could also
be the state of residence of the last known owner and the state where
the corporation has its main place of business. This would be an
important factor for consideration if the -nuntber of contacts were the
test in determining which of the several contesting states has the superior
claim.
It could be contended that once the contacts necessary to give a
state a superior claim were determined, then only those states which have
such contacts be permitted to escheat. However, this could often bar
any escheat of the funds, permitting the corporation to be permanently
enriched. If only the state of the last known owner, for example, were
permitted to escheat, the range of its acquisitions would be limited to
those corporations over which jurisdiction could be acquired, unless suit
could be brought in the courts of other states or in the federal courts. On
the other hand, to establish the place of incorporation as the determining
contact would overcome the jurisdictional problem. However, the escheat
of stocks and dividends might be incongruous with the state's corpora-
tion policy. A few states may find it more advantageous, in conformity
with liberal charter laws, to offer protection from escheat actions.
Therefore, the present system of permitting any state to escheat
which has the constitutional basis to do so, i.e., sufficient contacts with
the property, although conducive of a "race of diligence," is probably
more satisfactory than an arbitrary selection of any one contact, barring
37. This would include granting the corporate charter, the use of the state's trans-
portation and communication facilities, its labor supply, and the protection of its laws.
NOTES.
some states who would otherwise have a justifiable claim. However,
other states should be permitted to contest the right of the escheating
state to take or retain the property, either by a direct suit against the
state or in an interpleader action. The answer to the question of which
of the states has the superior right in a direct conflict between them can
only be determined by a balancing of the interests in any particular fact
situation. However, if and when a conflict among the enumdrated states
is presented to the Supreme Court, it would be desirable to choose one
controlling factor as determinative of who has the superior claim. Once
the choice of a controlling element is made, greater uniformity, stability,
and predictability can be attained.38 This choice should be the domi-
ciliary state of the last known owner,3 9 thereby providing more pro-
tection to the stockholders, who have the primary interest, and a more
equitable distributing of the funds among the states.
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION OF THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act' in 1946 was universally
regarded as a needed step towards governmental responsibility for the
tortious conduct of its agents. In general, the purpose of the legislation
was to assimilate, in so far as practicable, the position of the government
in respect. to liability for the "negligent and wrongful acts" of its
employees, to that of a private employer. Congress, however, chose
to limit the relinquishment of its sovereign right and clearly indicated,
this intent by the inclusion of thirteen exceptions to the waiver of
immunity.
While the majority of the exceptions are directed to specific gov-
38. This solution is analogous to the technique used in the Conflict of Laws, where
one factor is often taken as determinative in order to provide uniformity in the
law. See, e.g., Hoxie v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 82 Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754 (1909);
Clark v. Southern Ry., 69 Ind. App. 679, 119 N.E. 539 (1918); Garnett v. Boston &
M. Ry., 238 Mass. 125, 130 N.E. 183 (1921) (In actions ex delkto the law of the
state where the tort was committed governs the rights of the parties).
39. See Shestack, Disposition of Unclaimed Property-A Proposed Model Act,
46 ILL. L. REv. 48, 75 (1951). Professor Shestack suggests a provision for escheat
by the domiciliary state of the last known owner.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (Supp. 1950).
